Ultimately, the tentative integration of Prabowo’s political networks with those of other political elites in Indonesia provides some cautious optimism about the permanence of Prabowo’s political transformation – one that aligns with U.S. interests and democratic values. But several factors still warrant skepticism.
First, while Prabowo has ditched his usual divisive rhetoric, he has clung onto “people-centered” rhetoric that may still serve as a catalyst for democratic backsliding.
This is not unlike the so-called “technocratic populism” that has been ascribed to Jokowi: an ideology and strategy to “gauge and articulate” what the “people” want, in the face of elite corruption and political gridlock.
Still, this technocratic populism can lead to the erosion of democratic norms, such as when Jokowi, seeking to extend his political legacy and ensure policy continuity, pushed for constitutional changes that permitted his eldest son to run as Prabowo’s running mate.
Moreover, the other constraints listed above are linked to Prabowo’s electoral calculations: he has restrained himself because he would like to win, not because of any discernible change in principles. He has ditched his exclusionary, quasi-Islamist form of populism because it did not favor him in previous elections; he has emulated Jokowi because he believes that is the winning formula.
But what happens after he is elected to office? What happens if Jokowi’s popularity starts to decline among voters and elites, as might be happening after the Gibran affair?
In the end, U.S. observers and government officials should be cautiously optimistic about apparent changes in Prabowo’s behavior, but should not be blind to the risks that supporting or engaging with a potential Prabowo regime may entail.
