The Prabowo of late, however, has been described as a different kind of politician. He shed his image as a “modern-day warrior” (pendekar) and positioned himself as a “patriot ready to serve his people” (pengabdi) and a “keen student and follower” of Jokowi’s leadership style.
He has traded his usually divisive rhetoric and behavior for more inclusive and forgiving messaging. Rather than dismiss his political rivals as immoral or corrupt, he has instead heaped effusive praise and made highly-publicized and choreographed “political courtesy visits” (silaturahmi politik).
For example, when the National Awakening Party withdrew from his coalition in September of this year, he called its leaders his brothers and did not accuse them of disloyalty. Prabowo earlier this year visited Gen.
Wiranto, who famously fired him from the military in 1998 and is now part of a rival political coalition, and called him his “boss.”
And while Prabowo’s previous campaigns relied on subtly signaling support to radical Islamist groups, his current campaign has seen him reach out to moderate Muslim voters and leaders.
Prabowo’s efforts to soften his image have improved his reputation among the Indonesian public, diverse members of the Indonesian political elite and civil society, and international policymakers.
Besides meeting with then-defense secretary Mark Esper in 2020, ending his nearly two-decade ban from the United States, and meeting with current-defense secretary Lloyd Austin in September this year, he recently received the endorsement of Budiman Sudjatmiko, a Suharto-era student activist and former cadre of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).
And according to polls conducted in May this year, he has the tentative support of 32.7 percent of youth voters (between ages 17-26), well ahead of the next candidate, the PDI-P’s Ganjar Pranowo, at 24.5 percent.
In explaining Prabowo’s shift in strategy and style, commentators inside and out of Southeast Asia have offered two perspectives. The first gives Prabowo full agency: he has determined that the tactics of his previous campaign – demonizing fellow political elites and tenuously working with radical Islamist groups – could never win him a national election.
The second starts by acknowledging Jokowi’s continued popularity among the Indonesian people, and the constraints it has placed on national politicians. Prabowo has thus looked to Jokowi’s style of politics, one that seeks to build as wide a coalition as possible, and sought to emulate it.
Another factor that is frequently ignored is the effect that Jokowi’s “cooptation” of Prabowo into his cabinet has had on the psychology, political strategy, and incentives of the formerly populist politician.
Indeed, since becoming the defense minister in 2019, alongside his party Gerindra joining Jokowi’s parliamentary coalition, Prabowo has integrated himself into “establishment” patronage networks that would likely be costly to break free from.
These patronage networks, centered around the president and involving other parties, have made Gerindra and Prabowo more accountable and financially reliant upon fellow elites, ultimately making populist rhetoric awkward to deploy.
